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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES - STOP-AND-FRISK STATUTES
People -v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595,
273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
In the recent case of People v. Peters,' the New York Court
of Appeals had its first opportunity to pass upon the constitution-
ality of New York's stop-and-frisk statute2 which became effective
on July 1, 1964. An off-duty policeman heard noises in the hall-
way of his apartment building early one afternoon. He looked
through .the peephole in his door and saw two men walking stealth-
ily about the hall. After reporting the incident to the local police
by telephone, he returned to the door to see the men going toward
the stairway. Getting his gun, he chased the men and collared
the defendant, whom he did not recognize as a tenant, on the
stairs. The defendant's explanation for his presence in the build-
ing was unconvincing, and the policeman led him to the next
floor where he frisked him for a weapon by patting his pockets
and under his arms. Feeling a hard object which he thought might
be a knife, the officer reached into the defendant's right pants
pocket and withdrew an opaque plastic envelope. In the envelope,
the officer discovered six picks, two Allen wrenches, and a tension
118 N.Y.2d 238,219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
2 The following is the text of the statute:
S 180-a Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for
weapons.
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
felony or any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this
chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to
this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he
may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds
such a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a
crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at
which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such per-
son. N.Y. CODE CraM. PROc § 180-a (Supp. 1964).
The New York statute is based upon the UNIFoRm ARREST AcT §§ 2 & 3. The
text of that act is reprinted in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315,
343-47 (1942). Three states have adopted the act: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902-
03 (1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2-3 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-
7-1 to -2 (1956). A similar provision is included in a very recent draft of a model
code by the American Law Institute. MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DUJ §§ 2.02(2), (5) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). These statutes are basically similar
in that, despite the absence of probable cause, they permit a police officer to detain per-
sons whom he suspects have committed a-cime. They also permit the officer to "searchY'
the suspect for a weapon, and none of them use the term "frisk."
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bar. The local police, who had arrived in response to the officer's
call, arrested the defendant and charged him with possession of
burglary tools.'
At trial, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and
dismiss the indictment was denied, and he was convicted on his
plea of guilty. The conviction was affirmed by the appellate divi-
sion, and the defendant appealed by permission.4 The court of
appeals affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. It held that a
policeman, who "reasonably suspects" that he is in danger5 while
questioning a suspect detained pursuant to .the stop-and-frisk law,
may frisk the suspect for a weapon. The court further held that
if the officer finds an item, the possession of which is unlawful,
he may then arrest the suspect, and the evidence so discovered is
admissible.6
The stopping and questioning of the defendant in Peters was
found not to constitute an arrest but merely a limited detention
for the purpose of inquiry.' It is elementary that a search incident
to a lawful arrest is constitutionally valid and that an arrest is
lawful if based on probable cause.' According to the court in
Peters, however, since a stop is not an arrest, it is valid if sup-
ported by the "reasonable suspicion" of the officer,9 which is the
statutory standard.1" The court explained .the difference between
"probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" as follows:
"[Pjrobable cause" requires satisfactory grounds for believing that
a crime was committed, while "reasonable suspicion" requires sat-
isfactory grounds for suspecting that a crime was committed. The
difference between these two standards is proportionate to the
difference in degree of invasion between an arrest and a detention,
between a full search and a frisk."
The basic theory supporting the power of the police to stop and
3 18 N.Y.2d at 241, 219 N.E.2d at 597, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 220 (1966).
4 Id. at 242, 219 N.E.2d at 597, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
8 The court evidently believed that the officer felt endangered even though he
took the defendant down a flight of stairs to the next floor before conducting the frisk.
6 18 N.Y.2d at 242-43, 219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
7 Id. at 244, 219 N..2d at 598-99, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
8 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
9 18 N.Y.2d at 244,219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
10 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (Supp. 1964). For text of the statute, see note
2 sapra.
11 18 N.Y.2d at 246, 219 NB.2d at 600, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 224. Thus the court
distinguishes between a full search and a frisk and states that it is only the frisk which
is authorized by the statute. Presumably, the court felt the distinction was necessary
because the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) applies
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question suspects is that the prevention of crime necessitates prompt
inquiry into suspicious circumstances and that the denial of the
right to stop and frisk would usurp the policeman's power and de-
stroy his effectiveness as a crime preventive force.1" Thus the right
to detain and question suspects is seen as a basic tool in the police-
man's crime prevention kit. Some federal cases have hinted that
even federal officers must possess the power to stop and question
as a necessary part of their investigative repertoire. 8 However,
there has been no Supreme Court decision regarding the admis-
sibility of evidence discovered during a search or frisk incident to
a detention not based upon probable cause.'4 The Supreme Court
did make one statement, in Ker v. California,5 which is frequently
cited and relied upon in the stop-and-frisk cases. In that case,
eight justices agreed that
the States are not... precluded from developing workable rules
governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical de-
mands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement" in
the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitu-
tional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the
concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible
against one who has standing to complain.' 6
While detention for questioning is justified as a necessary in-
vestigative power, the frisk is upheld upon "grounds of elemental
safety."'" Proponents of the frisk rule point out that -the policeman
who is questioning a suspect must be permitted to frisk or search
him for a weapon. The law must allow the officer to protect him-
where evidence is discovered by a search not based on probable cause. New York has
applied the Mapp rule many times. E.g., People v. Caliente, 12 N.Y.2d 89, 187 N.E.-
2d 550, 236 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1962); People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d
95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223
N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
12 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 444-45, 201 N.E2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d
458, 461 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
18 See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960); United States v. Vita, 294
F.2d 524, 528-32 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962). A federal district
court sitting in New York has recognized the validity of a detention based upon reason-
able suspicion. United States ex fel. Alexander v. Fay, 237 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
14 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 249, 219 N.E.2d 595, 601, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217,
226 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Fuld, J.).
15 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
3. Id. at 34. The Peters court cited Ker and argued that since the frisk is reason-
able it is therefore constitutionally valid. 18 N.Y.2d at 247, 219 N.E.2d at 600, 273
N.Y.S.2d at 224-25 (1966).
.7 Id. at 245, 219 NXE.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 223; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d
at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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self.18 This argument is quite valid if one assumes -the validity
and the necessity of the power of the police to stop and question
on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
The next step, having shown that the stop and the frisk are
permissible, is to declare that therefore the evidence is admissible.' 9
This conclusion follows logically from a determination that the
frisk was lawful but not necessarily from the underlying purpose
of the frisk rule. Assuming that the reason for allowing the frisk
is to protect the police officer, would he not be just as well pro-
tected if the evidence which he discovers without probable cause
were held inadmissible? It would thus seem possible to have the
best of both rules and to protect both the safety of the officer and
the right of the suspect to be free from searches not based on prob-
able cause.
It has been suggested that in cases where the evidence seized
is not a weapon,2" it should not be admissible.2 ' If this approach
were used, a suspect would be protected from prosecution for pos-
session of the article seized, but, of course, the officer would have
discovered information which would lead him to watch the future
activities of the suspect. A stricter approach, for example, one
which would allow the frisk but deny the admissibility of any evi-
dence found, including weapons, is no less unsatisfactory. The re-
sult obtained would, in effect, be treating the frisk as valid while
treating the evidence as though it were the fruit of an unlawful
search.
An argument has been offered in support of the right to stop
and frisk which adds some weight to the theory that the evidence
discovered during a frisk, whether or not it is a weapon, should be
admissible. This argument is advanced by Justice Traynor who
18 Warner, supra note 2, at 324-25.
19 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 246, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217,
223 (1966).
2 0 E.g., People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 NE.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217
(1966) (burglary tools); People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.
2d 374 (1966) (heroin); People v. Norris, 46 Misc. 2d 44, 258 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup.
Ct. 1965) (marijuana cigarettes); People v. Martin, 46 Cal 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52
(1956) (marijuana).
21 People v. Sibron, supra note 20, at 605, 219 N.E.2d at 197, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 376
(1966) (dissenting opinion of Van Voorhis, J.); 50 CORNELL LQ. 529, 538 (1965).
This argument was declared unsound by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), wherein the Court stated: "Once a search of the
arrested person for weapons is permitted, it would be both impractical and unnecessary
to enforcement of the Fourth Amendment's purpose to attempt to confine the search
to those objects alone." Id. at 769.
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states that giving the police officer the right to stop and question
would involve
such a minor interference with personal liberty that it would touch
the right of privacy only to serve it well If questioning failed to
reveal probable cause, it would thereby forestall invalid arrests of
innocent persons on inadequate cause and the attendant invasion
of their personal liberty and reputation. If it revealed probable
cause it would do no more than open the way to a valid arrest.22
Thus, Justice Traynor argues, only the criminal is harmed by
permitting detention of suspects, and presumably his argument
could be extended to assert that only the criminal is harmed by
the frisk. This argument is rather weak in that it gives the guilty
person (or one who, although innocent, unwittingly possesses some
article unlawfully) a lesser right than that reserved for the inno-
cent. Also, it must be pointed out that although the search of
an innocent person would reveal nothing incriminating, it is not
at all dear that being detained and questioned by a policeman is
only a slight invasion of privacy. It seems likely that a certain
stigma could attach to persons who are detained, even though it
probably would be less serious than the stigma connected with an
arrest. It has been suggested that employers and others who re-
quest people to fill out personal history forms may ask whether
persons have ever been detained in addition to the usual question
regarding arrests.
Another argument which has been advanced in support of the
frisk rule is that since the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v.
Ohio25 was established to deter unlawful police conduct, it should
not apply to frisks which are, and will continue to be, conducted
by police officers for the purpose of self-protection. It is argued
that policemen will frisk suspects for weapons as a matter of self-
2 2 Traynor, fapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 334.
A similar statement is found in United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 791
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
23 In an analogous vein, the numerous cases holding that an arrest is not justified
by what the subsequent search discloses, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959), or that a search is not justified by what is discovered, e.g., United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), must implidtly reject the idea that there is a different
standard for the guilty than for the innocent. As Judge Fuld points out, "the rights
and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution are assured to every individual, to the
worst and meanest of men as well as to the best and most upright." People v. Peters,
18 N.Y.2d 238, 249, 219 NXE.2d 595, 601, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 226 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
2 4 Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L REv. 16, 37 (1957).
25367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a discussion of the case, see note 11 supra.
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protection whether or not the law permits it.26 This amounts to a
confession that the law can do nothing about the abuse of police
power and constitutes a decision to give up the effort. It seems that
the law should not condone unlawful, improper police practices by
setting a lesser standard. 7
Critics of the stop-and-frisk laws are numerous and vociferous,
one of the most persuasive being Judge Fuld who fled a strong
dissent in Peters.28 Judge Fuld feels and fears that stop-and-frisk
laws are simply a means of evading the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures and of emasculating the
Mapp rule.29 Indeed, the chief drafter of the Uniform Arrest Act
has stated that one of the virtues of the statute is that it makes it
possible to convict known criminals of carrying concealed weapons
even in jurisdictions following the exclusionary rule."
As long as the officer is searching for a weapon rather than
contraband, any contraband he discovers is likely to be held admis-
sible. It has been said that "we must be careful to distinguish that
the frisk ... includes only a frisk for a dangerous weapon. It by
no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material,
or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest."'"
Since there are often only two parties present at the time of a
frisk, the officer and the suspect, the question whether the officer
was actually searching for a weapon is likely to be determined on
the basis of the conflicting testimony of the two parties.3" Other
2 6 Warner, supra note 2, at 325; 50 CORNELL LQ. 529, 537 (1965).
27 See Foote, supra note 24, at 43, where it is suggested that setting more lenient
standards might not make police compliance with the law more likely.
28 18 N.Y.2d at 248-49, 219 N.E.2d at 601-02, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26 (1966)
(dissenting opinion).
2 9 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 448, 201 NXE.2d 32, 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458,
464 (1964) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
30 Warner, supra note 2, at 325-26. The Mapp rule has already been considerably
eroded by the frisk cases. A gun discovered in a man's briefcase during a frisk was
held admissible in a prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon, even though the
policemen could have protected themselves by simply keeping the briefcase out of the
reach of the suspect. People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.
2d 833, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1964), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 382 U.S.
20 (1965), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 383 U.S. 575
(1966). In People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1966), a search rather than a frisk was upheld. The court did not admit that it was
a search which was upheld, but there was no patting of the defendant's exterior cloth-
ing before heroin was discovered in his pocket. The Supreme Court could reverse
this decision without reaching the question of the validity of the frisk by holding that
the search in Sibron was not of the type authorized by the New York statute.
31 State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (1966).
3 2 E.g., People v. Norris, 46 Misc. 2d 44, 258 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1965). The
only witness who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the frisk was the police
1036 [Vol. 18: 1031
STOP-AND-FRISK STATUTES
things being equal, it is probable that the officer's testimony will
be considered more reliable. In addition, it would be naive to
think that the availability of the frisk for a weapon would not lead
to a strong emphasis in police training on the importance of the
frisk as a self-protective measure with the perhaps subconscious
hope that it would turn up evidence which could be used to con-
vict criminals. Thus, it would seem likely that the frisk would
become an extremely popular police practice,"s one which is pe-
culiarly subject to abuse by over-zealous policemen.
Police detention, questioning, and frisking based only on rea-
sonable suspicion may be a major source of friction between the
police, who represent society and its rules of conduct, and members
of minority groups, such as Negroes and teenagers, who are least
able to assert their constitutional rights. 4 It seems probable that
a police officer who customarily abuses his right to stop and frisk
would be less likely to mistreat a well-dressed member of the upper
or middle classes than a Negro or teenager, who he knows is less
able and less likely to seek redress for an invasion of his constitu-
tional rights.
Attorneys for Peters have filed a jurisdictional statement to the
United States Supreme Court. Because the Court has never passed
upon the validity of either a common law or statutory stop-and-
frisk rule, the future of this case will be watched with interest by
both prosecutors and defense counsel. If the Court affirms Peters5
officer who conducted it. Needless to say the court accepted his testimony that he
thought the defendant might be carrying a weapon. Obviously the testimony of the
officer is likely to be uncontradicted in all those cases where the defendant exercises
his constitutional privilege to remain silent.
33 But see Warner, supra note 2, at 324, where it was argued, more than twenty
years ago, that good police practice necessitates a frisk prior to the commencement of
questioning of a suspect.
34 See Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161
(1966).
35 It seems unlikely that the Court would affirm Peters because of the fourth amend-
ment objections discussed herein. Two of the Court's recent decisions indicate a less
obvious but quite cogent objection which would probably be applied to the stop-and-
frisk rule. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court set forth a com-
prehensive code covering custodial interrogation and the admissibility of statements
made by an accused in such a situation. The Court indicated that the rules applied
"when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities and is subjected to questioning." Id. at 478. Miranda admittedly is based
on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the reasoning under-
lying the decision seems equally applicable to the stop-and-frisk situation, because
the suspect who is stopped and frisked would almost certainly be held to have been in
custody. In addition, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), decided soon
after Miranda, the Court upheld the admissibility of blood test evidence taken from an
accused who was in custody despite his refusal to submit to the test. The Court dis-
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or merely denies certiorari, it seems probable that other states will
follow New York's lead and pass similar statutes or adopt the frisk
rule by judicial decision."0 The frisk rule is undeniably a limitation
on Mapp v. Ohio,37 and if the Supreme Court upholds the rule's
constitutionality or remains neutral, prosecutors and police com-
missioners in other jurisdictions will be in a better position to bring
about its adoption.
Effective law enforcement and the protection of police officers
performing this task are important objectives in our society, but
they do not outweigh the individual's right of privacy." It is sub-
mitted that the stop-and-frisk concept as interpreted by the New
York Court of Appeals will constitute a positive threat to the in-
dividual's right of privacy unless effective rules for the prevention
of its abuse are developed.
WILBUR C. LEATHERBERRY
tinguished between "testimonial" and "physical" evidence for the purposes of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. While the gun in Peters is "physical" evidence like
the blood sample in Schmerber, the Court made it clear that even physical evidence
could not be taken from an accused unless the search was supported by probable cause.
Id. at 768.
36 An Ohio court followed the latter course in State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122,
214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). A Pennsylvania court relying upon Terry and other cases
also adopted the frisk rule. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 223 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1966). But see United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1966), where
a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania rejected the frisk rule.
87 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a discussion of the case, see note 11 supra.
3 8 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
1038
